Hinge Commitments
Hinge Commitments
This chapter explores a fourth way of casting the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation. Like the nonpropositional reading used to tackle the account's “closure problem” in the previous chapter, this fourth method is a nonepistemic proposal in that it does not treat our hinge commitments as being in the market for rationally grounded knowledge. Unlike the nonpropositional reading, however, it is not allied to additional philosophical theses that are independently controversial. With this construal of our hinge commitments in place, the chapter further explores the anti-skeptical ramifications of this proposal, including in contrast to superficially similar anti-skeptical stances.
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, hinge commitments, nonepistemic proposal, anti-skeptical stances, rational evaluation
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