Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons
This chapter demonstrates that epistemological disjunctivism represents a viable theoretical option when it comes to our understanding of perceptual knowledge. It also shows that this proposal has direct application to the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the new evil demon intuition and the insularity of reasons thesis that underlies it, and hence is in a position to deny one of the claims that makes up this paradox. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism can also lay claim to being an undercutting anti-skeptical proposal. Finally, the chapter discusses how epistemological disjunctivism is able to trade on the general epistemological distinction that has been drawn between favoring and discriminating epistemic support.
Keywords: epistemological disjunctivism, perceptual knowledge, radical skepticism, anti-skeptical proposal, epistemic support, underdetermination
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