Competition Policy, Regulatory Architecture, and Public Intervention in the Crisis
Competition Policy, Regulatory Architecture, and Public Intervention in the Crisis
This chapter examines the optimal design of the financial regulatory architecture and the relationship it should have with the competition policy authority. It first considers cases in the European Union and the developments since the adoption of banking union proposals, along with the reform in the United Kingdom since the 2007–2009 crisis. It then discusses public interventions in crisis and how competitive distortions of state aid and mergers induced by the crisis can be dealt with by competition policy. It also explores the consequences of state ownership and the performance of hybrid institutions such as savings banks as well as the state aid policy in the EU banking sector. The chapter goes on to assess the role of competition policy in addressing the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem before concluding with an analysis of the treatment of mergers in crisis situations, focusing on cases in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Keywords: competition policy, European Union, state aid, mergers, financial crisis, competition, state ownership, savings banks, banking sector
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