Immigration, Trade, and Firm Mobility: A Political Dilemma
Immigration, Trade, and Firm Mobility: A Political Dilemma
This chapter argues that trade, firm mobility, and productivity change firms' preferences over immigration and their willingness to support low-skill immigration, which makes it harder for policymakers to support low-skill immigration, leading to restrictions on low-skill immigration. It first considers the political dilemma arising from immigration policy in the face of greater globalization by drawing on both classic Ricardian trade theory and “new” new trade theory before discussing alternative explanations of immigration policy. It argues that trade openness and firm mobility decrease political support for low-skill immigration in wealthy countries. It also examines firms' lobbying for immigration as the foundation of the political dilemma faced by policymakers. Finally, it analyzes the empirical implications of the argument for firms and sectors, policymakers, and immigration policy.
Keywords: trade, firm mobility, productivity, firms, globalization, low-skill immigration, policymakers, immigration policy, trade openness, lobbying
Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
