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Noncooperative Game TheoryAn Introduction for Engineers and Computer Scientists$
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João P. Hespanha

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780691175218

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691175218.001.0001

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Policies

Policies

Chapter:
(p.13) Lecture 2 Policies
Source:
Noncooperative Game Theory
Author(s):

João P. Hespanha

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691175218.003.0002

This chapter explains the distinction between the concepts of “actions” and “policies,” along with the implications of this distinction. An action is defined as a possible move that is available to a player during a game, whereas a policy is a decision rule that a player uses to select actions, based on available information. In game theory, the word “strategy” is commonly inferred to be synonymous to policy. The chapter first illustrates the actions vs. policies distinction by considering a game in marketing known as the advertising campaign game. It then discusses the war of attrition game as an example of a multi-stage game and an open-loop game called zebra in the lake game before concluding with practice exercises related to the Nash equilibrium and a chicken game with alternate play, with their corresponding solutions.

Keywords:   action, policy, advertising campaign, war of attrition, multi-stage game, open-loop, zebra in the lake, Nash equilibrium, chicken game, alternate play

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