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Noncooperative Game TheoryAn Introduction for Engineers and Computer Scientists$
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João P. Hespanha

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780691175218

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691175218.001.0001

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Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games

Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games

(p.105) Lecture 9 Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Games
Noncooperative Game Theory

João P. Hespanha

Princeton University Press

This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ‎₁ and Γ‎₂, respectively. Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other player. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security policy and Nash equilibrium for two-player non-zero-sum games, bimatrix games, admissible Nash equilibrium, and mixed policy. It also explores the order interchangeability property for Nash equilibria in best-response equivalent games before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.

Keywords:   non-zero-sum, security policy, Nash equilibrium, bimatrix game, admissible Nash equilibrium, mixed policy, best-response equivalent games, order interchangeability property

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