- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts?
Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts?
- Chapter:
- (p.21) One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts?
- Source:
- Why Not Default?
- Author(s):
Jerome Roos
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
The striking puzzle at the heart of international lending has long been known as the “enforcement problem” of cross-border debt contracts: clearly there is some kind of cross-border enforcement at work, but the precise mechanism through which it operates is not immediately observable, and economists still do not understand how exactly it works. This chapter discusses the four conventional explanations of debtor compliance found in the economics literature, and assesses their validity in light of the available evidence. The four explanations center on (1) the borrower's long-term reputation; (2) legal and trade sanctions; (3) democratic institutions; and (4) spillover costs.
Keywords: international lending, debtor compliance, external debt, sovereign debt, long-term reputation, trade sanctions, democratic institutions, spillover costs
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- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
