- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance
The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance
- Chapter:
- (p.147) Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance
- Source:
- Why Not Default?
- Author(s):
Jerome Roos
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This chapter details how the growing dependence of the Mexican state on credit contributed to the rise of a domestic “bankers' alliance” made up of financial elites and orthodox technocrats who gradually found their position strengthened as the crisis deepened, allowing them to effectively sideline the national-popular wing of Mexico's one-party regime. The strengthened position of these groups led to the steady internalization of fiscal discipline into the Mexican state apparatus, ensuring continued debt servicing and a cooperative stance vis-à-vis foreign creditors even in the absence of outright external impositions. This turn toward compliance was eased by the fact that popular opposition to continued debt servicing remained relatively muted due to the cooptation of the main labor and peasant organizations and the absence of powerful popular mobilizations against austerity.
Keywords: Latin America, financial crisis, debt crisis, bankers' alliance, debt servicing, Mexico
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- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
