The Defeat of the Athens Spring
The Defeat of the Athens Spring
This chapter considers the short-lived standoff between Syriza and the Troika in the first half of 2015. It asks: why did the Syriza-led government not simply suspend payments and pursue an aggressive debt restructuring, as Argentina had in the wake of its own anti-austerity revolt in December 2001? The standoff presents a unique test of the structural power hypothesis because it concerns a case in which the stated preferences of foreign lenders visibly clashed with the stated preferences of the debtor country. The chapter argues that the ultimate reasons for Greece's continued compliance in 2015 must be sought in a combination of two factors: first, the extremely hostile response and overwhelming structural power of the country's foreign lenders; and second, the internal divisions within the Syriza government, which gradually led to a reassertion of the third enforcement mechanism of internalized debtor discipline following its partial and temporary breakdown after Syriza's ascent to government.
Keywords: Greek debt crisis, Greece, financial crisis, structural power, Syriza party
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