- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
Shaking Off the Burden
Shaking Off the Burden
- Chapter:
- (p.298) Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden
- Source:
- Why Not Default?
- Author(s):
Jerome Roos
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This concluding chapter summarizes key themes and presents some final thoughts. The three in-depth case studies of Mexico, Argentina, and Greece showed how the newfound insistence on full and uninterrupted debt service has had far-reaching social implications, leading to a very skewed distribution of adjustment costs between private financiers in the advanced capitalist countries and working people inside the peripheral borrowing countries. The crises in these countries also signaled the start of a new era in international lending; a phase marked by the growing capacity of international creditors to shape the outcomes of major financial disturbances to their own advantage. This has, in turn, greatly undermined the quality of democracy in the debtor states, leading to more intrusive forms of creditor control and greater disregard for established democratic procedures.
Keywords: financial crisis, debt crisis, Mexico, Argentina, Greece, debt service, international creditors, democracy
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- Title Pages
- Tables, Figures, and Boxes
- Acknowledgments
- Acknowledgments
-
Introduction The Sovereign Debt Puzzle -
One Why Do Countries Repay Their Debts? -
Two A Critical Political Economy Approach -
Three The Structural Power of Finance -
Four Three Enforcement Mechanisms -
Five The Making of the Indebted State -
Six The Internationalization of Finance -
Seven From Great Depression to Financial Repression -
Eight Syndicated Lending and the Creditors’ Cartel -
Nine The IMF’s “Triumphant Return” in the 1980s -
Ten The Rise of the Bankers’ Alliance -
Eleven “The Rich Got the Loans, the Poor Got the Debts” -
Twelve The Exception That Proves the Rule -
Thirteen From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student -
Fourteen The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera -
Fifteen “Even in a Default There Is Money to Be Made” -
Sixteen The Power of Finance in the Eurozone -
Seventeen Anatomy of a “Holding Operation” -
Eighteen The Establishment Digs In -
Nineteen The Socialization of Greece’s Debt -
Twenty The Defeat of the Athens Spring -
Conclusion Shaking Off the Burden -
Appendix A Word on Methodology - Notes
- References
- Index
