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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780691183268

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: January 2019

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 17 May 2022

Dream Skepticism

Dream Skepticism

(p.21) Chapter Two Dream Skepticism

Ernest Sosa

Princeton University Press

This chapter talks about how pure reason (deductive or inductive) will not yield nearly enough of what one believes ordinarily. People's knowledge of hands and fires is not explicable based on proper reasoning from the agent's reflectively accessible subjective states. One should reject the sheer assumption that only reasoning from the foundational given will provide or explain whatever knowledge one may enjoy. The chapter shows how academic skeptics are more assertive in claiming that they know nothing, either in general or in some large department of their supposed knowledge. It considers the claim that humans know nothing at all, and demonstrates that if the very making of a claim commits the global skeptic also to knowledge of what is claimed, then they contradict themselves.

Keywords:   pure reason, knowledge, subjective states, foundational given, skeptics, global skeptic

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