Regress Skepticism
Regress Skepticism
This chapter examines one of the main strands of thought that can be distinguished in the dialectic on philosophical skepticism. This strand concerns the problem of the external world and how that relates to a particular sort of externalism in epistemology—naturalist externalism—which has taken various forms in the epistemology of recent years, including causal, tracking, process, and virtue varieties. The chapter shows how some practices or faculties or competences, by contrast, are not checkable independently. These are practices or faculties or competences that are “fundamental.” The chapter illustrates how it would be an accomplishment to reduce perceptual cognition to more fundamental cognition, such as armchair cognition, including introspection and pure reason.
Keywords: philosophical sketpticism, externalism, naturalist externalism, perceptual cognition, fundamental cognition, armchair cognition, introspection
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