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Epistemology$
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Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780691183268

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: January 2019

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.001.0001

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Knowledge as Action

Knowledge as Action

Chapter:
(p.71) Chapter Five Knowledge as Action
Source:
Epistemology
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.003.0005

This chapter argues that judgment and knowledge itself are forms of intentional action. Such action falls under a certain normative structure of success, competence, and aptness, or success that manifests competence. Judgment is a special case falling under that structure. The chapter explains that intentional actions come in two sorts. An attempt is an intentional action, an endeavor to attain a certain objective. An attempt can fail and remain a mere attempt, whereas an achievement is a certain sort of successful attempt. Intentional actions are one sort of performance. Some performances are also aimings, however, without being intentional. These, too, can fail and remain mere aimings, to be distinguished from those that are successful.

Keywords:   intentional action, judgment, knowledge, success, competence, aptness, attempt, performance

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