Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780691183268

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: January 2019

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 20 May 2022

Two Forms of Virtue Epistemology

Two Forms of Virtue Epistemology

(p.140) Chapter Nine Two Forms of Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa

Princeton University Press

This chapter explains how two quite distinct forms of virtue epistemology are generally recognized. One of these finds in epistemology important correlates of Aristotle's moral virtues. Such responsibilist character epistemology builds its account of epistemic normativity on the subject's responsible manifestation of epistemic character. Meanwhile, the other form of virtue epistemology adheres closer to Aristotelian intellectual virtues while recognizing a broader set of competences still restricted to basic faculties of perception, introspection, and the like. The chapter shows that because of its focus on traditional faculties such as perception, memory, and inference, such virtue reliabilism is said to overlook character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage.

Keywords:   virtue epistemology, Aristotelian moral virtues, Aristotelian intellectual values, epistemic character, perception, introspection, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, virtue reliabilism

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.