Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780691183268

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: January 2019

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 24 July 2021

Knowledge, Time, and Negligence

Knowledge, Time, and Negligence

Chapter:
(p.157) Chapter Ten Knowledge, Time, and Negligence
Source:
Epistemology
Author(s):

Ernest Sosa

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691183268.003.0010

This chapter analyses Saul Kripke's dogmatism paradox. It argues that, in order to address properly that puzzle, one needs a notion of epistemic negligence that fits naturally within a virtue-theoretic framework. Kripke's puzzle concerns a prospective intention to close one's mind. A second puzzle is closely related. Instead of the prospective intention, it concerns an antecedent belief: namely, that any further evidence will be misleading if negative. Once you attain knowledge, you virtually know that any contrary evidence will be misleading and is best ignored. When negative evidence does come forth at some later time, scholars wonder whether a person should ignore it in accordance with what they already know. This problem is resolved by noting that knowledge can be lost with a change of evidence.

Keywords:   Saul Kripke, dogmatism paradox, negligence, prospective intention, antecedent belief, negative evidence, knowledge

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.