This chapter combines tools and methodologies from institutional analysis, political economy, and history. It argues that the creation of a stable, growth-enhancing constitution requires a set of steps. These include a consensus on a shared set of values capable of commanding support over time, a self-enforcing institutional structure that reflects those values, and regulatory mechanisms for policy-making that enable trade-offs of inclusion. By trade-off of inclusion, it means a process whereby institutional access is extended differentially across the domains of politics, economics, law, and society to increase prosperity without jeopardizing stability. The chapter aims to weave strands of the literature to provide a theoretically rigorous and empirically new account of constitutional emergence and endurance. It also connects the study of constitutions to the study of the conditions that foster political and economic development.
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