- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
-
Chapter One An overview -
Chapter Two The theory choice and of consumer demand -
Chapter Three Choice under uncertainty -
Chapter Four Dynamic choice -
Chapter Five Social choice and efficiency -
Chapter Six Pure exchange and general equilibrium -
Chapter Seven The neoclassical firm -
Chapter Eight The competitive firm and perfect competition -
Chapter Nine Monopoly -
Chapter Ten Imperfect competition -
Chapter Eleven Modeling competitive situations -
Chapter Twelve Solution concepts for noncooperative games -
Chapter Thirteen Incomplete information and irrationality -
Chapter Fourteen Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation -
Chapter Fifteen Bilateral bargaining -
Chapter Sixteen Moral hazard and incentives -
Chapter Seventeen Adverse selection and market signaling -
Chapter Eighteen The revelation principle and mechanism design -
Chapter Nineteen Theories of the firm -
Chapter Twenty Transaction cost economics and the firm - postscript
-
appendix one Constrained optimization -
appendix two Dynamic programming - Index
Imperfect competition
Imperfect competition
- Chapter:
- (p.325) Chapter Ten Imperfect competition
- Source:
- A Course in Microeconomic Theory
- Author(s):
David M. Kreps
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This chapter explores models of imperfect competition. Firms in these models have rivals, and the actions of their rivals affect how well they do. But at the same time, firms are not price takers; when they optimize, they take into account how their actions affect the prices they face both directly and, through possible reactions of their rivals, indirectly. The chapter examines the classic models of duopoly with undifferentiated goods: Cournot, von Stackelberg, Bertrand, and kinked demand. It then discusses some of the many important issues that impinge on the basic models. The problems present the opportunity to move beyond informal discussion.
Keywords: imperfect competition, firms, duopoly, undifferentiated goods, Cournot conjectures, von Stackelberg duopoly, Bertrand conjectures, kinked demand
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
-
Chapter One An overview -
Chapter Two The theory choice and of consumer demand -
Chapter Three Choice under uncertainty -
Chapter Four Dynamic choice -
Chapter Five Social choice and efficiency -
Chapter Six Pure exchange and general equilibrium -
Chapter Seven The neoclassical firm -
Chapter Eight The competitive firm and perfect competition -
Chapter Nine Monopoly -
Chapter Ten Imperfect competition -
Chapter Eleven Modeling competitive situations -
Chapter Twelve Solution concepts for noncooperative games -
Chapter Thirteen Incomplete information and irrationality -
Chapter Fourteen Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation -
Chapter Fifteen Bilateral bargaining -
Chapter Sixteen Moral hazard and incentives -
Chapter Seventeen Adverse selection and market signaling -
Chapter Eighteen The revelation principle and mechanism design -
Chapter Nineteen Theories of the firm -
Chapter Twenty Transaction cost economics and the firm - postscript
-
appendix one Constrained optimization -
appendix two Dynamic programming - Index
