Show Summary Details
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
-
Chapter One An overview -
Chapter Two The theory choice and of consumer demand -
Chapter Three Choice under uncertainty -
Chapter Four Dynamic choice -
Chapter Five Social choice and efficiency -
Chapter Six Pure exchange and general equilibrium -
Chapter Seven The neoclassical firm -
Chapter Eight The competitive firm and perfect competition -
Chapter Nine Monopoly -
Chapter Ten Imperfect competition -
Chapter Eleven Modeling competitive situations -
Chapter Twelve Solution concepts for noncooperative games -
Chapter Thirteen Incomplete information and irrationality -
Chapter Fourteen Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation -
Chapter Fifteen Bilateral bargaining -
Chapter Sixteen Moral hazard and incentives -
Chapter Seventeen Adverse selection and market signaling -
Chapter Eighteen The revelation principle and mechanism design -
Chapter Nineteen Theories of the firm -
Chapter Twenty Transaction cost economics and the firm - postscript
-
appendix one Constrained optimization -
appendix two Dynamic programming - Index
(p.816) (p.817) Index
(p.816) (p.817) Index
- Source:
- A Course in Microeconomic Theory
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
-
Chapter One An overview -
Chapter Two The theory choice and of consumer demand -
Chapter Three Choice under uncertainty -
Chapter Four Dynamic choice -
Chapter Five Social choice and efficiency -
Chapter Six Pure exchange and general equilibrium -
Chapter Seven The neoclassical firm -
Chapter Eight The competitive firm and perfect competition -
Chapter Nine Monopoly -
Chapter Ten Imperfect competition -
Chapter Eleven Modeling competitive situations -
Chapter Twelve Solution concepts for noncooperative games -
Chapter Thirteen Incomplete information and irrationality -
Chapter Fourteen Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation -
Chapter Fifteen Bilateral bargaining -
Chapter Sixteen Moral hazard and incentives -
Chapter Seventeen Adverse selection and market signaling -
Chapter Eighteen The revelation principle and mechanism design -
Chapter Nineteen Theories of the firm -
Chapter Twenty Transaction cost economics and the firm - postscript
-
appendix one Constrained optimization -
appendix two Dynamic programming - Index
